“令人信服的证据”证实Grenfell塔楼不符合建筑法规
Inquiry finds "compelling evidence" Grenfell Tower did not comply with building regulations

由专筑网麻雀，小R编译

调查发现，在翻新的过程中，Grenfell塔楼的外部增加了隔热层、覆层和装饰面层，这些做法不符合建筑法规。

这份长达1000页的报告已被调查主席Martin Moore-Bick公布。它展示了调查的第一阶段的发现和建议。

第一阶段检查了幸存者和急救人员的证据和证词，确定了2017年6月夜间，当时一幢高层建筑中的一场大火导致71人丧生，其中大部分人因火势蔓延而被困在烟雾环绕的建筑外墙内。

Moore-Bick说：“有力的证据表明，建筑物的外墙设计不符合《 2010年建筑物条例》附表1的B4（1）要求。”

“考虑到建筑物的高度、功能和位置，它们无法抵抗火势的蔓延。相反，它们促进了火势的蔓延。”

1984年《建筑法》和2010年《建筑法规》规定，“建筑物的外墙应能够抵抗火势蔓延，对现有建筑物的改动不应违反建筑法规”。

火势通过塑料窗框蔓延至外墙层

Grenfell塔楼建于1974年，作为议会大厦，从2015年到2016年花费了数百万英镑进行翻新。

具有聚乙烯芯的铝复合材料的（ACM）防雨板和由聚异氰脲酸酯（PIR）泡沫制成的隔热板用于围绕现有的钢筋混凝土墙，从而作为新外墙。

2017年6月14日凌晨1：14，第一批消防人员抵达16号楼的厨房，那里是起火点。

在调查的第二阶段，将对建筑面层系统的翻新计划进行更彻底的检查，但是专家和幸存者作了关于火的起源和蔓延的证词。

Moore-Brick说：“尽管我本来并不打算在第一阶段得出有关该塔是否符合《建筑规范》的结论，但我认为既然与建筑的外墙有关，那就应该确定是这个问题我。”

“我接受《建筑规范》的构建最终是一个法律问题，并且有令人信服的证据表明在这种情况下未满足要求B4（1）。否则就违反了法规规定。”

专家得出结论，大火最有可能进入建筑面层，其主要是通过标准电气设备大火产生的热烟使uPVC窗框变形而造成的。

专家总结说，在ACM面板被点燃之前，大火点燃了窗框周围的可燃材料。

装饰性的塑料造成了火势的蔓延

火焰在不到20分钟的时间内就在ACM防雨层内垂直向上蔓延到塔上，聚乙烯芯（一种最常用于制造塑料袋和包装的可燃合成热塑性聚合物）成为了燃料。

面层后面的隔热板中的PIR和酚醛泡沫也是导致火势蔓延的原因之一。

塔顶装饰层中暴露的聚乙烯在燃烧时融化并滴落，进一步引发建筑物下方的大火，火势同时也向上蔓延。这就是大火在建筑物的所有面上蔓延的方式，直到整个塔楼都从外面开始燃烧。

覆层已固定在建筑物顶部的预制混凝土体量上。除了装饰，它们没有其他功能。 爱丁堡大学的建筑学教授，报告的专业见证人Luke Bisby说，当建筑顶部燃烧时，它就像一个“线性熔断器”，将火势向水平蔓延。

在新的面层和保温层与旧的混凝土墙之间留有空隙，以使建筑的面层中能够通风。 但是在大火的夜晚，这个空腔让火点燃了能够助燃的材料。

安装了条形止活带缝隙，为了在起火时它们会膨胀并阻塞缝隙。 但是，专家说，在火焰位于ACM面板内部的火灾中，阻隔屏障几乎没有用。

当大火的燃烧热量导致窗户无法开启时，建筑物外部的火势蔓延到公寓。厨房的抽气扇变形并移位，这也是导致大火进入内部的原因。同时一些防火门失灵或被撑开。

建筑行业和政府的消防安全标准将被调查

Moore-Bick说，一场大火在三小时之内从垂直蔓延到水平蔓延，并吞没了一座高层建筑。

“考虑到这一点，我打算在调查的第二阶段检查用于外墙的材料，热塑性聚合物材料，例如聚乙烯，及其管理规定。使用这种方法已经足够识别和控制向下和水平以及垂直火焰蔓延的潜在危险。”

“我还将研究建筑行业的人员和负责制定消防安全标准的相关人员对热塑性聚合物所带来的特殊危险的了解情况。”

面层砖制造商Arconic和建筑翻新承包商Rydon在报告的现阶段对Moore-Brick做出有关建筑法规的判断表示反对。但是，Moore-Brick坚持认为Grenfell塔楼的外墙不能抵抗火势蔓延的证据太明显了。

Moore-Brick说：“无论出于何种原因，我都认为没有合理的理由来争辩建筑物的外墙符合要求B4（1）。因此，没有充分的理由取消报告，这仅是不言而喻的结论。”

接下来，相关人员将探讨负责安装覆盖系统和替换窗户的人员如何让Grenfell塔楼满足建筑法规。

“我感到满意的是，尽管有许多不同的因素在起作用，但火焰如此迅速地蔓延到整座建筑物的主要原因是带有聚乙烯芯的ACM面板的存在，该面板的燃烧速度快，熔化并充当了着火的源头。它成为火灾的助燃剂。”

Moore-Brick尚未就面层提出任何建议，但政府已禁止使用类似的面层材料，具有类似系统的建筑物现在可以申请政府拨款，以帮助拆除和更换面层。

提前撤离塔楼可以挽救更多生命

尽管当晚有227人逃离了塔楼，但Moore-Bick的报告还说，如果撤离塔楼的决定早些做出，那么可以挽救更多的生命。

该报告强调了伦敦消防队没有明确撤离塔楼的要求，塔楼没有疏散计划，事故指挥官也没有接受过高层建筑外墙火灾蔓延的救援培训。

如果撤离的决定在凌晨1：30到1：50之间做出，那么楼梯仍相对无烟，则可以挽救更多的人。

Moore-Bick说：“我敏锐地意识到当晚值班的人员面临着前所未有的局面，他们没有做好充分的准备，人员和系统都被灾难的规模淹没了。”

“首先应该说的是，在最悲惨的情况下，控制室中的人员和部署在事件现场的人员以极大的勇气和奉献精神做出了回应。”

Insulation, cladding and decorative fins added to the exterior of Grenfell Tower during refurbishment made it noncompliant with building regulations, the inquiry into the disaster has found.
The 1,000 page report has been published by inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick. It presents the findings and recommendations from the first stage of the inquest.
The first phase examined evidence and testimonies of survivors and first responders, establishing a timeline of the night in June 2017 when a fire in a high-rise building killed 71 people, most of whom had become trapped in the smoke-filled tower as fire spread around the external walls.
"There was compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with Requirement B4(1) of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations 2010," said Moore-Bick
"They did not adequately resist the spread of fire having regard to the height, use and position of the building. On the contrary, they actively promoted it."
The Building Act 1984 and the Building Regulations 2010 states that externals walls of buildings should be able to resist the spread of fire, and that alterations made to existing buildings should not make the building noncompliant.

Fire spread to cladding via plastic window frame
Built in 1974 as council housing, Grenfell Tower underwent a multi million pound refurbishment from 2015 to 2016.
Aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with a polyethylene core and insulation panels made with polyisocyanurate (PIR) foam were used to create a new exterior wall around the existing reinforced concrete walls.
The fire was in the cladding system before the first firefighters arrived in the kitchen of Flat 16, where the fire started, at 1.14 am on 14 June 2017.
The refurbishment scheme that introduced the cladding system will be examined more thoroughly in the second phase of the inquiry, but experts and survivors testified about the origin and spread of the fire.
"Although it was not originally my intention to reach conclusions in Phase One about the tower’s compliance with the Building Regulations, I can see no good reason why that question should not be determined now so far as it relates to the external facade," said Moore-Brick
"I accept that the construction of the Building Regulations is ultimately a question of law and there is compelling evidence that requirement B4(1) was not met in this case. It would be an affront to common sense to hold otherwise."
Experts concluded that the most likely way the fire got into the cladding was through a hole made when hot smoke from a standard electrical appliance fire made the uPVC window jamb deform.
Combustable insulation materials around the window frame then ignited, experts concluded, before setting fire to the ACM panels.

Unusual spread of fire caused by decorative plastic crown
It took less than 20 minutes for flames to spread vertically up the tower within the ACM rainscreen, fuelled by their cores of polyethylene – a combustible synthetic thermoplastic polymer most commonly used for making plastic bags and packaging.
PIR and phenolic foam in the insulation boards behind the cladding also contributed to the fire rate and spread.
Exposed polyethylene in the decorative crown that topped the tower melted and dripped as it burned, starting additional fires further down the building, which also spread upwards. This was how the fire travelled across all the faces of the building, until the whole tower was burning from the outside in.
Fins of cladding had been fixed at the top of the building on the pre-cast concrete architectural crown. They served no function beyond decoration. As the crown burned it acted like a "linear fuse" spreading the fire horizontally said Luke Bisby, an architecture professor at the University of Edinburgh and expert witness for the report.
Gaps had been deliberately left between the new wall of cladding and insulation, and the old concrete wall, to allow ventilation and any water that got in to dry out. But on the night of the fire this cavity allowed the fire to reach the materials that fuelled it.
Cavity barriers with strips that expand in the event of fire and block the gaps had been installed, but the investigation also found they were poorly fitted and had gaps between them. However, experts said that in a fire where the flames were inside the ACM panels, such as Grenfell Tower, the barriers would have been little use halting the spread of the flames.
The fire on the outside of the building got into the flats when the heat caused the windows to fail. Extractor fans in kitchens deformed and dislodged, also letting the fire in. Some fire doors failed or were propped open.

Construction industry and government fire safety standards will be investigated
A fire that spreads horizontally and can engulf a high-rise building in under three hours is unusual, said Moore-Bick.
"With that in mind, I intend in Phase Two of the Inquiry to examine (among other things) the extent to which the regime for testing materials intended for use in external walls (including thermoplastic polymer materials such as polyethylene) and the regulations governing their use were, and are, adequate to identify and control the potential dangers from downward and horizontal as well as vertical flame spread," he said.
"I shall also examine what was and should have been known, both by those in the construction industry and by those in central government responsible for setting fire safety standards, about the particular dangers posed by thermoplastic polymers."
Cladding manufacturers Arconic and the refurbishment contractor Rydon pushed back against Moore-Brick making a judgement about building regulations at this stage in the report. However, Moore-Brick insisted the evidence that Grenfell Towers walls did not resist the spread of fire was all too obvious.
"I can see no rational basis for contending that the external walls of the building met requirement B4(1), whatever the reason for that might have been," said Moore-Brick. "There is therefore no good reason for deferring to a later report what is no more than a self-evident conclusion."
Next the inquiry will look at how those responsible for the installation of the cladding system and replacement windows – including Arconic, Rydon, and architects Studio E – were satisfied that Grenfell Tower met building regulations.
"I am satisfied that, although many different factors played a part, the principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up the building was the presence of the ACM panels with polyethylene cores, which had high calorific value, melted and acted as a source of fuel for the growing fire," he said.
Moore-Brick has made no recommendations about cladding yet, but the government has already banned similar cladding materials and buildings with similar systems can now apply for a government fund to help get it removed and replaced.

More lives could have been saved by an early tower evacuation
Although 227 people escaped the tower that night, Moore-Bick's inquiry also said that more lives could have been saved if the decision to evacuate the tower had been made earlier.
The report highlighted how the London Fire Brigade failed to recognise that compartmentalisation had failed and the tower needed to be evacuated. There was no evacuation plan for the tower, and incident commanders had not been trained on how fires on high rise building facades can spread.
If the decision to evacuate had been made between 1.30am and 1.50am, when the stairways were still relatively smoke-free more people could have been saved.
"I am acutely conscious that those who were on duty that evening were faced with an unprecedented situation for which they were not properly prepared and that both personnel and systems were overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster," said Moore-Bick
"It is right to say at the outset that those in the control room and those deployed on the incident ground responded with great courage and dedication in the most harrowing of circumstances."